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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
VERNAL K. FRONK,
Appellant,

vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH in the interest of VERNAL FLOYD FRONK,
RICKY DEAN FRONK, and CINDY
LEE FRONK,

Case No.

8734

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the most part, respondent does not dispute the
basic facts set forth in appellant's statement, but does place
different emphasis and interpretation on some of them, as
will be pointed out in the course of the argument below.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWED THE APPELLANT NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE CUSTODY OF
THE CHILDREN; AND THE COURT ACTED
WITHIN ITS PROPER DISCRETION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER.

POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN PERMANENTLY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
AND ORDERING THEM TO BE PLACED FOR
ADOPTION RATHER THAN :MERELY CONTINUING THEM IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.

POINT III
THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE WAS IN _-\
BETTER POSITION THAN THE COURT ON
APPEAL TO DETERMINE THE MERIT AND
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, AND
HIS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
SHOWED THE APPELLANT NOT A FIT AND
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE CUSTODY OF
THE CHILDREN; AND THE COURT ACTED
WITHIN ITS PROPER DISCRETION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER.

It is true that the Juvenile Court felt it had jurisdiction of the custody matter without the necessity of
obtaining such jurisdiction through referral from the District Court by virtue of having held earlier proceedings
involving said custody. It nevertheless is true also that the
matter was referred by the District Court, and that the
Juvenile Court Judge did accept it on that basis, and in doing so and in conducting the hearing on June 10, 1957, the
Juvenile Court did affirmatively adopt the findings of fact
and conclusions of law made by Judge Wahlquist in the
divorce proceedings, which findings are set out below and
which clearly show that appellant was unfit to have custody
of the children (R. 2).
A determination as to appellant's character thus was
made by two different courts, and the finding of both indicated him to be lacking in certain necessary traits of character, and to be incapable of properly caring for the children.
In the June lOth proceeding, (R. 2) the trial judge
took judicial notice of the findings and decree in a divorce
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action involving Mr. and Mrs. Fronk, out of which this
matter arose. This the court was entitled to do by virtue
of Section 78-25-1, U. C. A. 1953. See State v. Bates (Utah)
61 P. 905. It was found in the divorce matter (and adopted
by the court below) that "The defendant Vernal K. Fronk
is not presently a fit and proper person to have the care,
custody and control of the said minor children. He has not
been shown to be law-abiding, honest or understanding of
his children's needs or welfare." (Par. 5 of Findings of
Fact.)
It was found in the earlier proceeding and judicially

noticed by the Juvenile Court trial judge that appellant had
treated Mrs. Fronk cruelly, and that he had been convicted
of a felony by a United States Military Court. (Par. 8,
Findings of Fact.)
The fact of conviction of a felony alone was considered
of much importance by the Utah legislature in enacting
Section 55-10-32, which section deals with the preferred
right of parents to the custody of their children. There,
one of the exceptions to the general rule that a child should
not be taken from the custody of the parents is a situation
where a "parent, having full custody and control over a
child, or the child's legal guardian has been convicted of
a felony * * *." Here, of course, Mr. Fronk did not
have full custody and control of the children in and of himself.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Fronk were deprived of custody in
the same proceeding at the same time. If the court now
were to restore custody of the children to appellant, how-
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ever, having fully deprived his ex-wife of the custody on
a permanent basis, he would again be covered by the abovementioned exception. While it is admitted that it is not
mandatory to take a child from a parent having full custody
upon said parent being convicted of a felony, nevertheless
the language of the statute certainly would seem to indicate the importance the legislature places on conviction of
a felony.
Appellant minimizes the seriousness of his conviction
of the felony, and his subsequent incarceration in a federal
military prison. Other jurisdictions have granted to their
courts the right to determine whether custody should be
denied on such basis. 41 L. R. A., N. S., 592; 39 Am. Jur.
p. 617; Kelsey v. Green (Conn.) 37 Atl. 679.

In re Case's Guardianship, cited by appellant to show
that a felony conviction is not sufficient grounds for deprivation of custody, was a case where the appellant had
been incarcerated for a crime which occurred many years
before. There, the court held that the conviction and imprisonment were too remote in time to have a bearing on
the custody question. The situation is much different here.
Appellant still was in confinement at the time of the September, 1956 hearing (which initially deprived him of
custody) for a crime which had only recently occurred. It
is clear that this would not be at all remote as to time. It
should be noted that the findings and decree in the divorce
matter were dated April 26, 1957, and that the hearing
from which this appeal was taken occurred on June 10,
1957, just six weeks afterward. It is beyond respondent's
comprehension how the character of this man could so have
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changed (particularly in light of the evidence introduced in
the second hearing) in that short a period of time as in any
way to weaken the effect of or make untimely the April 26th
finding.
In Kennison v. Chokie (Wyo.) 100 P. 2d 97, the court
states:
"It is stated in 22 C. J. 86, that proof of the
existence at a particular time of a fact of a continuous nature gives rise to an inference within logical
limits that it exists at a subsequent time. That inference has been applied in cases of reputation or
character, of chastity, and of personal habits. 22
c. J. 88."
Appellant calls attention to a statement in 67 C. J. S.
at page 659 to the effect that:
"In order to establish unfitness, it must be
shown that provision for the child's ordinary comfort or intellectual and moral development cannot
be reasonably expected at the parents' hands."
In the very next paragraph, it is stated that:
"But it has been stated broadly that the requirement that the welfare of the child shall be the
guide in awarding custody is satisfied if the parents
are honest and responsible with a disposition and
the capacity to maintain and educate the child."
The text thereupon cites the case of In re Bourquin (Mont.)
290 P. 250, where the court inferred that the parents must
be honest in order to be entitled to custody of the child. As
pointed out before, there has been a positive finding that appellant has not been shown to be honest (Par. 5, Findings of
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Fact in Divorce) and therefore, according to the terms of the
rule cited in the above text and case, appellant is not of
sufficiently good character to retain custody of the children.

Haines v. Fillner (Mont.) 75 P. 2d 803, well states the
proposition that the welfare of the child is of paramount
consideration. It says:
"On the other hand, it is equally as firmly established that the prima facie right of the parent is
not absolute, but that the question of paramount
importance is the welfare, present and future, of
the child."
Another Montana case, In re Thompson, 25 P. 163, states:
"The rule which obtains in most of the courts
of this country is that in awarding the custody of a
minor, the welfare of the child is to be regarded
more than the technical rights of the parents."

In re Hogue, (N. M.) 70 P. 2d 764 states:
"A child's welfare and best interest as controlling right to custody of child in adoption proceedings is not measured altogether by material and
economic factors, but parental love and affection
must be considered."
In Kennison v. Chokie, (Wyo.) supra, the court said:
"The paramount question at all times in the
custody and control of a minor child, is the welfare
of such child."
Appellant minimizes the importance of the evidence
brought to bear on his character as it relates to custody of
the children. It would seem that the fact that appellant
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was shown to "run around" and that on an occasion he
caused a serious disturbance in a tavern, while frightening
and upsetting his ex-wife, is not without importance (R.
14) particularly in that appellant chased his ex-wife into
the ladies' rest room (R. 14) . The children's mother testified that she did not believe, on the basis of appellant's
background, that he could be a good father to the children
(R. 16) . Evidence then is adduced that he would not be a
proper person to have custody of the children because of
his running around with girls (R. 16); and that he did
not stay home with the children and tend to his responsibilities regarding them during the period in which his own
mother had them, which is hardly proper conduct for a
father (R. 16).
Mrs. Gorter, the mother of appellant's ex-wife, testified that she thought appellant did not have love for his
children, basing this estimate on the way appellant associated with the first baby (R. 25). Other evidence as to
appellant's immaturity is shown by appellant's calling his
former in-laws on the telephone late at night and telling
them their daughter was drunk (R. 27), whereas considerable testimony indicated she was not.
Appellant's summary of the evidence presented against
him in the June proceeding and set forth on page 8 of his
brief is at best quite sketchy. In addition to failing to take
into account some of the matters just mentioned, it fails
to consider the fact that appellant also had served time in
the Industrial School, according to Albert Wimmer, who
knew the family well (R. 39). At page 32 of the transcript
appellant attempts to detail his plans for taking care of
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the children. An examination of his statements shows that
his plans at best are very vague. He states "Well, I could,
my aunt could take care of them at the home, or I could
live with my aunt at her home up on-between 26th and
27th." This sort of a life, with the father gone all of the
time and an older woman caring for them during the day
and probably several hours during the evening, would not
be conducive to their proper care and growth. Clearly, the
welfare of the children should come first, and they would
certainly be much better off in a proper home as adopted
children where they could receive the attention of both
mother and father (R. 39). Findings in the divorce matter
(paragraph 5) which were adopted by the Juvenile Court,
state that Mrs. Fronk, mother of appellant, is not "such a
fit and proper person because she shows gross hatred for
the mother of the children, has indulged in physical violence
with said mother, has shown inability to control her emotions and evaluate problem situations in the months just
past." It is obvious that the children would have considerable association with this woman whether or not the aunt
were to enter into the picture, which entry appears very
indefinite.
At R. 38 evidence is introduced showing that appellant's mother was working full time during the day at Hill
Field. The apparent indecision of appellant as to just how
the children would be cared for in his absence while at work
points up the importance of his establishing a good home
life for them at such times as he should be unable to be with
them. There is little question that from the ages of his
aunt and his mother, and the fact of their having so many
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outside interests that they would not be good people to care
for young children. Appellant's aunt, in fact, has four
grown and married children (R. 45) and is 63 years old
(R. 47).
The case of Clarke v. Lyon (Neb.), 118 N. W. 472; 20
L. R. A., N. S. 171, states as follows:
"The degree of unfitness which would deprive
a parent of the natural right to the custody of his
children, while it must be positive and not comparative, must be considered in relation to the attending circumstances, such as the concern he has shown
for them in the past, the suitability of his domestic
parents to receive them, and the question of their
general welfare."
Appellant's brief refers to pages 31 and 32 of the record, wherein evidence is set forth relating to appellant's
employment status, income, attitude toward the children,
and his plans for their care. This evidence is said to preponderate over the negative evidence described above. It
should be noted that the evidence is constituted mostly of
appellant's uncorroborated statements. Therefore they are
mostly self-serving and certainly must be considered in
that light. As to the substance of appellant's evidence, his
earning power and his employment are not indicative of
his rights to have the care and custody of the children.

POINT II
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN PERMANENTLY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN
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AND ORDERING THEM TO BE PLACED FOR
ADOPTION RATHER THAN MERELY CONTINUING THEM IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.
Respondent agrees with the first sentence under appellant's Point II. The statute mentioned does not place
any limitation whatever on the period of time for which
an offending parent may be deprived of custody, assuming
the other statutory provisions under 55-10-32 and 55-10-30,
U. C. A. 1953, are complied with. It is true also that specific standards of conduct are not exactly defined. The
application of standards is for the judge of the case involved acting on the basis of past precedents and his own
best judgment after careful examination of the facts and
upon observation of the demeanor of the witnesses. Therefore, considering the words of the statutes alone, if the
judge properly so decides, he may take custody from the
parents for an unlimited period of time, even permanently.

POINT III
THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE WAS IN A
BETTER POSITION THAN THE COURT ON
APPEAL TO DETERMINE THE MERIT AND
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, AND
HIS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has said that the trial
judge stands in a superior position to determine the facts
of a case and that he is better equipped to pass on the evi-
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dence before him than is the court on appeal. This view is
of general application. Specifically, it has been applied in
a situation very similar to the one at hand in In Re Bradley
(Utah), 167 P. 2d 978, cited by the appellants for another
purpose. There the court said :
"Cases involving the custody of the child are
cases in equity, and the Supreme Court on appeal is
required to determine the facts as well as the law,
having in mind that the trial judge who heard and
saw the witnesses was in a better position than the
Supreme Court to weigh and evaluate the evidence."
CONCLUSION

It is respondent's conclusion that the Juvenile Court
Judge acted within his discretion in permanently depriving
appellant of custody of the child upon a preponderance of
the evidence, which showed appellant not to be a fit and
proper person to have such custody. The Juvenile Court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering the children placed for
adoption, rather than merely continuing them in the custody of the Welfare Department.
Again referring to the oft-cited rule of law that the
welfare of the child is more important than the natural
right of parents to keep custody of their children, we
strongly urge the Court to uphold the decision of the Juvenile Court below in placing the children out for adoption.
The children, during the last few months, have been transferred from place to place and been subjected to strong and
contrary influences, and respondent believes that any further indecision as to their status will be most damaging to
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their characters and personalities. As previously stated,
there appears to be no statutory prohibition against the
permanent deprivation of custody in such a case.
In the event this court decides that the children should
not be taken permanently from the custody of appellant, it
would appear that the children nevertheless should be continued under the jurisdiction of the Welfare Department
until such time as a further order is entered.
It is respectfully submitted that the decree of the Juv-

enile Court of the First District should stand.

Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondents.
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